A rush is underway for access to the Pacific seabed.

Deep-sea ecosystems have attracted interest for their genetic resources, which science and industry are exploring for potential application in areas including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, agriculture and cosmetics. The number of submarine cables across the region has grown substantially over the past decade, particularly since 2020. And perhaps most contentiously, deep-sea mining proponents have sharpened their focus on the considerable amount of minerals found in the Pacific seabed.

These emerging sectors are attracting new and reenergised stakeholders to the region, each seeking access to the Pacific seabed and its resources. This brings both opportunities and challenges. Above all, it calls for responsible seabed stewardship.

To effectively manage accelerating deep-sea activities, it is critical the Pacific draw together in a collective approach to seabed governance.

Conversations around what regional collaboration for Pacific seabed governance could look like have been slowly growing over the past two decades. This year’s Deep-Sea Minerals Talanoa and 54^th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting marked key milestones in securing political endorsement of a “member-led regional approach to deep-sea minerals”.

This support for a regional approach to deep-sea minerals was an important step towards collective governance. Now, it’s time to puts words into action.

Laying the ground for seabed cooperation

A Pacific Seabed Stewardship Statement, as proposed in a new policy paper from the Pacific Security College, would prepare the ground for implementation of regional seabed cooperation. This statement would clearly set out common principles of deep-sea management and use that could guide collective policy and action. It would function as a foundation for mutual understanding and accountability on Pacific seabed governance, providing a reference point for Pacific stakeholders and partners alike.

This Statement could be advanced alongside the region’s existing commitment to a regional knowledge hub for Pacific seabed information. Critically, it should be leveraged as a starting point for regional cooperation – not its end.

There are three key features of the proposed Statement:

First, it would be a non-binding statement of seabed principles, not positions. This is important for building regional cooperation among stakeholders with diverse perspectives on seabed activities, particularly deep-sea mining.

Over the longer term, parties may look to incorporate these principles into a regional treaty – in the style of the Treaty of Rarotonga. However, in the interests of fostering robust and constructive dialogue that keeps all stakeholders at the table, it would be beneficial for this Statement to be non-binding at first.

Second, the Statement would expand regional cooperation beyond deep-sea minerals towards seabed governance in general.

The interconnected and transboundary nature of ocean activities encourages a holistic seabed approach, which would ultimately support better outcomes across all deep-sea sectors (e.g. submarine cables, marine genetic resources etc). De-centring deep-sea mining could provide the region with other critical areas around which to negotiate and build cooperation, while allowing deep-sea mining issues to receive due time and care for discussion.

Third, there already exists a robust set of shared seabed stewardship principles across the Pacific. These shared principles broadly reflect eight themes:  

• Heritage and connection
• Justice
• Ecosystem health
• Development
• Geopolitical management
• Knowledge
• Coordination and cooperation
• Governance

These principles affirm that while there are differences among the region regarding seabed management and use, there are also areas of convergence. They offer a springboard for negotiation of a Pacific Seabed Stewardship Statement, building on decades of thinking and discussion from around the region.

United we stand, divided we fall

As we know from experiences across fisheries and climate, the Pacific stands stronger when it stands together. A collective approach to Pacific seabed governance is both critical and pressing. Development of a Pacific Seabed Stewardship Statement would be a strong move towards regional deep-sea cooperation that can cultivate mutual understanding through shared commitments on seabed stewardship and care. This is critical in an age of accelerating seabed ambition and interest.

Negotiation of such Statement could be shepherded through the Pacific Islands Forum architecture, led by the Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner. Transparency, accountability and inclusion will be critical. As such, this Statement should be developed in consultation with a broad range of regional stakeholders, including customary leaders, faith groups, civil society and youth representatives.

Increasing interest in the Pacific seabed is introducing new and complex governance challenges that few, if any, nations can effectively manage on their own. Regional seabed cooperation may be a daunting task, but without it, the Pacific and its ecosystems risk being played in a global race to the bottom. Shared principles offer a decisive starting point in the journey to a regional seabed approach – one that will enable the Pacific to determine a path of its own choosing.

United we stand, divided we fall: The case for a Pacific Seabed Stewardship Statement is the first publication in the Pacific Security College Policy Paper Series. The papers aim to contribute a diversity of views and ideas to the regional conversation about the journey to 2050.

Dr Philippa Louey is a Research Fellow at the Pacific Security College. Her PhD examined the politics of sustainable ocean development agendas in the Pacific.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Read our publishing policy.

Proponents of deep-sea mining (DSM) have long evoked the principle of self-determination to argue in favour of seabed extraction.

This has been particularly apparent in Pacific contexts where some industry advocates have hailed DSM as an avenue to economic prosperity, self-reliance and subsequently, greater political sovereignty.

The Trump administration’s recent move to lease areas of American Samoa’s seabed for DSM activities – despite express opposition from the territory’s government and community – sharply undermines this principle of self-determination. It realises a fear that many in the Pacific have held of DSM as yet another front for imperialism.

So how did we get here and what ramifications may this decision have for American Samoa, the Pacific region and the deep-sea sector in general?

The push for DSM in American Samoa

Competition over critical minerals has intensified over the past 15 years as nations have come to recognise their dependence on China for the critical minerals required in advanced technologies such as computer chips, rechargeable batteries, and military equipment including fighter aircraft and missiles.

The U.S. Government began seriously pursuing efforts to secure and diversify its access to critical minerals in 2021 when President Biden ordered a review into America’s supply chains, led by the Department of Defense.

But it was not until Trump’s second presidency that seabed minerals took a starring role in Washington’s discussions on supply chain diversification – a shift largely driven by industry advocacy.

Earlier this year, Trump signed an executive order entitled unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources, which celebrated seabed minerals as “key to strengthening [the American] economy, securing [America’s] energy future, and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers for critical minerals”.

This order directed Washington to “take immediate action to accelerate” DSM and paved the way for the U.S. Department of Interior to initiate a process into leasing areas of American Samoa’s seabed for extractive activities.

Of the companies contemplating mining American Samoa’s seabed, Impossible Metals has been the most public in its interest.

The company describes DSM in American Samoa as beneficial to Washington’s geostrategic interests; including for its alleged potential to “[pull] the Cook Islands away from China’s support by providing available infrastructure”. Not only does this disrespect Cook Islands’ sovereignty to engage China for seabed activities within its own jurisdiction, but it also dismisses the Pacific’s longstanding refusal to be pawns of geopolitical competition.

As for American Samoa, Impossible Metals has promised just one per cent of profit share to the territory’s community should DSM commence, compared to three per cent of revenue for the U.S. Department of Treasury. American Samoan responses to this proposal have been scathing, with one local stakeholder describing the commitment as “an insult ... this is our ocean”.

Such payment disparity coupled with the environmental, cultural and political risks shouldered by the territory should DSM occur highlights ongoing inequities in Washington’s relationship with its South Pacific territory.

American Samoa’s opposition to DSM and solidarity movements

In stark contrast to Trump’s enthusiasm, the American Samoa government has firmly opposed DSM in its territory, with bipartisan support.

In July 2024, then Governor Lemanu Peleti Mauga issued an executive order declaring a moratorium on deep-sea mining exploration and exploitation activities within the territory (EO-006-2024). This stance was reaffirmed this August, with American Samoan Senators unanimously approving a resolution that endorsed the territory’s continued support for a DSM moratorium.

Across the world, support for American Samoa has been swift and strong. Pacific civil society, faith institutions, scientists and communities across other U.S. territories have stood in solidarity with American Samoa, arguing that “any approval of deep-sea minerals leasing plans would be contrary to the wishes of the local people and government”.

These allies remind us of the importance of self-determination in any consideration of DSM. In the words of the Pacific Conference of Churches: “This is not just an environmental issue. It is a question of justice, sovereignty, and faithful stewardship”.

Protecting the right to seabed stewardship

While DSM may strengthen the economic and political sovereignty of some Pacific states, current events in American Samoa expose how this sector may also threaten self-determination.

As industry and political figures ratchet up pressure to commence DSM without delay, we across the region must stand firm in protecting the right of communities to self-determined seabed stewardship.

Failure to do so risks waving the industry down a dangerous path of seabed imperialism, which once permitted, will be difficult to reverse.

Dr Philippa Louey is a Research Fellow at the Pacific Security College. Her PhD examined the politics of sustainable ocean development agendas in the Pacific.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Read our publishing policy.

On 24 April 2025, the Trump administration issued Executive Order 14285 mandating federal agencies to expedite permits for seabed mining under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980.

Trump wants to establish the United States as a global leader in seabed exploitation and loosen China’s grip on the critical minerals market. This helps explain why The Metals Company (TMC) recently announced plans to apply for seabed exploration and commercial recovery permits under this relatively old act.

Unilateral moves like this threaten to subvert the legal efforts of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the UN body responsible for regulating exploration and mining activities in international waters — otherwise known as the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction or simply “the Area”. The US refused to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the ISA’s protracted negotiation of the Mining Code has now given the US an excuse to strike out on its own.

These developments could undermine international law, commitments to peaceful use of the Area and environmental protections. But as one of us has argued, it could also sideline TMC’s Pacific partners. Nauru and Tonga are currently sponsoring TMC’s activities in the Area, but it’s not clear what it’s in it for them if TMC secures a permit for seabed mining under US law.

This coincides with Trump’s sustained attack on regulatory institutions, not least of all the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) which is supposed to regulate TMC’s activities if it’s granted a permit to operate in the Area.

As worrying as this is, it’s only one side of the coin. Trump’s executive order aims to position the US as the partner of choice for countries developing seabed minerals in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Since at least the 1970s, numerous Pacific countries have been exploring the possibility of deep-sea mining (DSM) in their domestic waters. So, while the media is rightly focussed on issues in the Area, we also need to pay attention to the pressures on the Pacific regulatory seascape.

A key starting-point was the €4.4 million SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project, funded by the European Union and managed by the Pacific Community (SPC). Between 2011-2016, the Project provided Pacific countries with advice on draft seabed minerals laws and policies and developed a regional framework to help harmonise seabed activities across the region. Table 1 provides a summary of these frameworks.

Table 1: Deep-sea mining regulations in the Pacific Islands

Clearly, the regulatory seascape remains irregular. Currently only seven countries have seabed minerals legislation (but not all of them have active DSM programs), while none have finalised a DSM policy. The remaining countries have either developed draft policies and rules or the process has simply stalled. Some have developed frameworks for activities in the Area and their EEZ. Others focus on one or the other. The institutions upholding the rules are similarly variable. Only Cook Islands and Nauru have operationalised a regulatory authority. In every other country this work has gotten stuck or been farmed out to other departments with other responsibilities — with major implications for regulatory capacity.

Two cases stand out.

Cook Islands has been a Pacific pioneer. In 2009, its government approved the world’s first Seabed Minerals Act and then in 2012 established the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority, another world first. The 2009 Act was enacted in 2013 and updated in 2019 to address issues of overcomplexity and account for the passing of the Marae Moana Act in 2017, which established a marine park over the country’s EEZ but also allows for seabed minerals activities. This created the enabling conditions to issue three exploration permits in 2022. Parliament then passed the Seabed Minerals (Minerals Harvesting and Other Mining) Regulations in 2024.

These developments establish a framework for future seabed mining, however, the Seabed Minerals Authority has faced criticism around its community consultation processes. Regulation requires more than rules and not everyone is convinced the regulator is resourced (or committed) to meaningfully engage the population.

Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, has been a forerunner and a laggard. In 1997, the government issued the world’s first seabed minerals exploration license to Nautilus Minerals Ltd. The absence of any specific DSM regulations didn’t slow things down. Fourteen years later, the government granted a 20-year mining license to the same company for the ill-fated project Solwara I project. The project would have proceeded under the 1992 Mining Act and would have been regulated by the Minerals Resources Authority (MRA), both of which are designed to deal with terrestrial mining. After participating in the EU-SPC DSM Project, the government has repeatedly promised to develop what it calls an “offshore mining policy”. Nothing has materialised.

After Nautilus sunk in 2019 perhaps this no longer mattered, with the government supporting calls for a DSM moratorium in 2019, and again in 2023. Since 2023, however, there has been renewed government interest in DSM. In March 2025 the government released the latest round of draft revisions to the Mining Act for public comment, which now includes a sub-section for offshore mining. It remains to be seen whether the revisions are ever finalised or if the offshore content meets international standards. Nevertheless, recent reports that exploration activities have been occurring in the Solwara 1 lease area without the knowledge of the MRA highlight the disregard some seabed contractors have for Pacific regulations and the urgent need for strong, well-resourced enforcement mechanisms.

Technological advancements combined with mounting political and economic pressures are gathering pace, bringing the prospect of DSM in the Pacific region closer than ever. TMC’s announcement and the prospect that it might be allowed to operate under the gaze of a gutted NOAA underscores the need for robust regulation at all levels – local, national, and international.

Effective regulation means more than having laws on the books and policies on the shelf. It requires capable institutions, technical expertise and long-term investment in governance. This means not only investing in creating legislation, but investing in the institutions, science, people and processes needed to enforce it.

The EU-SPC DSM Project provided a starting platform for seabed governance in the Pacific. A great deal more is needed. While Trump pulls the US out of the Pacific with one hand, with the other hand he may reassert US influence through seabed minerals companies working in the Area or Pacific EEZs. Australia needs to think carefully about this dilemma. One recommendation is to look at how it can invest in the development of regulatory institutions that can deal with increasing levels of complexity in seabed activity. Without it, the Pacific risks being taken for a ride.

Nicholas Bainton is Associate Professor in the School of Regulation and Global Governance at the Australian National University.

Philippa Louey is a Research Fellow at the Pacific Security College.

This article was first published on the DevPolicy blog.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Read our publishing policy.

Deep-sea minerals firm The Metals Company (TMC) has announced it is seeking to bypass international law and begin seabed mining in the high seas through a permit secured under United States (US) law. 

This proposal poses a major challenge to responsible seabed governance and more broadly, a global rules-based order.  

So how did we get here and what may this mean for the future of the international seabed? 

Tension: The US and the international seabed regime 

In 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened for signature, providing what is effectively the constitution for global ocean activities. UNCLOS is the cornerstone document of international law governing global ocean activities, including activities in the international seabed (i.e. the ocean-floor below the high seas).  

Since its establishment, UNCLOS has been ratified by 170 state parties, including the European Union, who are obliged to its provisions – at least theoretically.  

The US, however, never ratified the treaty, citing concerns over several seabed minerals provisions; two of which are particularly pertinent to the current situation with TMC:   

• First, that UNCLOS curtailed the freedom of the US to mine the seabed for “strategic and other minerals”.  

• Second, that requirements for technology transfer to a global seabed mining body (The Enterprise) undercut US strategic interests and industry.  

These concerns reveal how Washington has long prioritised US strategic minerals interests above collective and coordinated global oceans governance. Perhaps more subtly, they also imply that America has been prepared to undercut a global rules-based order on the grounds of seabed minerals for decades.  

This simmering risk has now risen to the surface, with the Trump administration entertaining TMC’s plan to flout the global seabed minerals system and commence mining outside international law.  

But why is TMC now seeking this back-door route to seabed mining approval? What has led TMC to Trump? 

Pressure: TMC and the international seabed regime 

Since 2001, the ISA has been issuing exploration contracts for plots of the international seafloor (the Area) for activities including resource surveying, technology testing and environmental studies. TMC, then known as DeepGreen, secured its first exploration contract from ISA in 2011 through an agreement between its wholly-owned subsidiary Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) and the Nauru Government as sponsoring state.  

From a seabed mining perspective, however, the ISA has not yet permitted exploitation activities on the international seafloor, such as large-scale seabed minerals extraction for commercial or strategic purposes. This is in large part due to the absence of international seabed mining regulations.  

The ISA began the process of negotiating seabed mining rules and processes in 2014, with draft regulations first submitted to its Council in 2019. This was welcomed by seabed mining proponents, who recognised these regulations as a critical step towards the realisation of an international seabed mining regime.  

Fast forward two years and the ISA had made only modest progress on the Mining Code, which was somewhat unsurprising given the complexity of governance issues, the diversity of its global membership, and still limited scientific knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems and the impacts mining may have on them.  

Frustrated by the ISA’s perceived ‘slowness’, TMC and Nauru invoked a legal loophole known as the ‘two-year rule’ in June 2021. This sought to fast-track the finalisation and adoption of the Mining Code by calling on a provision in UNCLOS that requires ISA to complete the negotiation and adoption of seabed mining regulations within two years.   

Refusing to be rushed, the ISA has stood firm and continued to dictate its own timeline for the Mining Code. These regulations remain under negotiation, with multiple key matters yet to be resolved, including the most contentious of all, benefit-sharing.  

TMC’s efforts to shoehorn the global community into an international regime for seabed mining has failed. This is the primary – yet perhaps not the only – reason for its courting of Trump and the current US administration to facilitate its seabed mining aspirations.  

An alternate path: TMC and the US 

As of March this year, TMC has initiated a process with the US Department of Commerce to apply for “commercial recovery permits” under the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). If approved, this will enable TMC to commence mining in the international seabed outside of international law in a quasi-parallel system established by the US.  

Four exploration licences have been issued under America’s DSHMRA to date, all in the minerals rich seabed of the Clarion Clipperton Zone. Two of these remain active and are both held by defence company Lockheed Martin.  

The granting of seabed mining permits through the US would also see TMC operate within the legal and governance systems of a single state, rather than being accountable to the international community. The potential economic advantages of this stakeholder streamlining should not be overlooked: quite simply, less parties mean that less pieces of the profit ‘pie’ need to be cut and distributed away from TMC coffers.  

For all of America’s claims about “responsible” seafloor use, it remains that any activities conducted through such a system sit outside of international law – recalling that the US has not ratified UNCLOS. Such initiatives would undermine collective, global efforts on seabed governance, erode the authority of the ISA, and set a precedent for internationally unregulated seabed mining. 

For the sponsoring states of TMC – Nauru and Tonga – this announcement is even more worrying. Without obligation to work within the international system of the ISA, TMC has little need for its Pacific partners to secure seabed mining permits. This risks Nauru and Tonga being seen as redundant partners – if not a drag on commercial efficiency.  

What role these Pacific partners will play in TMC’s seabed mining endeavours if licences are secured through US regulations remains uncertain. This issue may well test the “excellent” relationship between these parties. 

Common heritage or wild west? 

TMC’s negotiations with the Trump administration are major and urgent concern for responsible seabed governance. It may lead to the world’s first seabed mining project in the international Area – an area that is recognised as the “common heritage of (hu)mankind”.  

Such common heritage requires global management. It cannot be used as a playground for commercial companies and bullish governments to play out their cowboy fantasies as if the seabed were some lawless wild west.  

A collective effort is needed to challenge this reckless proposal.   

Philippa Louey is a Research Fellow at the Pacific Security College. She completed a PhD from the Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University in 2025 examining the politics of sustainable ocean development agendas in the Pacific.  

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Read our publishing policy.