Framing this question through a Small Island States (SIS) lens highlights how structural vulnerabilities embedded within this subgrouping can be interpreted as a point of sensitivity in Pacific regionalism.

This is not to imply a deficit of capacity among SIS members – Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Niue, Nauru, Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. Instead, it foregrounds categorisation and draws attention to a deeper constellation of structural development constraints that underpin it: geographic remoteness, limited infrastructure and institutional capacity, and heightened exposure to external shocks – particularly climate change and economic volatility. Collectively, these factors continue to shape SIS members’ ability to engage fully, consistently, and on equal footing in regional security processes.

However, these conditions do not diminish the value, agency or strategic importance of SIS members. Instead, they highlight where the regional architecture requires deliberate strengthening to ensure SIS perspectives are not overshadowed by the priorities of larger or better-resourced Pacific states.

This concern took centre stage at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue. In his opening keynote, Minister Simon Kofe warned against the strategic costs of fragmentation: “Fragmentation is now one of the most persistent strategic vulnerabilities facing our region. It erodes effectiveness, weakens resilience, and diminishes our collective influence.”

The characteristics of the SIS sub-regional grouping present a set of unique circumstances that must be addressed at the outset if regional security mechanisms are to function effectively and the Pacific is to advance a genuinely collective security agenda. Doing so enables the SIS grouping to deepen ownership of their security systems and readiness; though this ownership does not always equate to full leverage over their security landscape.

This is due to SIS members having huge governing responsibilities over vast maritime zones and widely dispersed geographies that impose governance, surveillance and operational demands far beyond their institutional, financial and logistical capacities.

Kiribati alone oversees an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of roughly 3.5 million km², placing it among the world’s largest ocean jurisdictions. The SIS states are not disadvantaged because they are small, but because they are immense. Ongoing scholarship and policy discourse have sought new narratives and labels that better reflect states of remarkable size, defined and bounded by ocean.

Their security challenges stem from the sheer scale of the domains they must manage, yet they are supported by only modest enforcement capacities. This imbalance turns tasks that appear straightforward – such as monitoring vast EEZs or delivering basic services across dispersed archipelagos and addressing challenges – into primary structural constraints, consistently stretching institutional and operational systems beyond their limits, while undermining capacities to address emerging security threats.

As the region confronts an increasingly complex security environment where multiple security pressures converge into what is now described as a ‘polycrisis’, the SIS subregional grouping is being exposed to heightened risks. This volatility creates greater openings for transnational organised crime and human trafficking networks to exploit the vast, sparsely monitored maritime spaces and limited enforcement capacities.

A resilient SIS security collective is essential for bridging this gap.

Central to this is the need for sustained investment in security infrastructure and governing mechanisms at the SIS national levels, designed to operate effectively within countries while remaining aligned with broader regional frameworks.

Despite substantial work in security cooperation through multilateral, regional, and national development strategies, a structural gap persists: the absence of a regional security architecture. In the absence of an overarching governance system, Small Island States will require deeper collaborative arrangements and institutional systems strengthening. This must include coordinated capacity development across the full security spectrum, from fisheries monitoring and surveillance, law and order, immigration and border enforcement, economic and climate shock preparedness, social and health security, and other expanded definitions of human security.

Such investments must be integrated both within national processes and in alignment with the regional mechanisms that support them, many of which currently operate in parallel, and at times in silos. Aligning these layers of governance ensures coherence, reduces duplication, and enables the SIS to benefit from a more connected and mutually reinforcing security architecture.

Crucially, such a step ensures that the grouping is consistently informed, connected and able to meet regularly to address security concerns as they arise. This aligns with the principles articulated in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the 2026 Pacific Security Outlook Report, both of which emphasise the importance of Pacific-led, proactive and coordinated security governance. Strengthening national systems in tandem with regional support enables SIS to move from reactive responses to a more prepared and planned approach to security threats.

Notably, this approach safeguards SIS agency and ownership and avoids pressures of externally driven security initiatives. A resilient SIS security collective must be grounded in its own priorities and agency, realistic capacity considerations, and an understanding of how a security strategy can organically support existing efforts rather than impose additional burdens.

When the SIS members feel genuine ownership over their security systems, regional strategies become actionable, meaningful and impactful. This also helps mitigate potential tensions or misunderstandings, particularly considering the pressures that culminated in the Micronesian Presidents’ walk-out and Kiribati’s withdrawal – episodes that exposed deep fractures in regional cohesion and shook confidence in the Pacific Islands Forum.

These ruptures did not simply challenge the Pacific Islands Forum’s integrity and legitimacy as the region’s elite political institution; they also underscored the vulnerability of the Pacific’s hard-won security work, built over decades of collective effort, trust building, and cooperation.

Ensuring SIS voices are meaningfully included through a security collective that proactively addresses their concerns is critical for promoting a workable and truly collective security architecture that embodies genuine Pacific Way regionalism in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

Dr Akka Rimon is a Research and Engagement Fellow at the Pacific Security College.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

Most Pacific Island countries now have national security policies and strategies.

Tuvalu and the Republic of the Marshall Islands are at various stages of domestic consultations, while another Pacific Islands Forum member – Australia – has yet to publicise a national security strategy.

As I have previously argued, developing national security strategies for our diverse and vast Pacific island geographies comes with many challenges, but their value in an era of intensified geopolitical and strategic competition remains significant. Not least because national security strategies are the foundation that underpins bilateral and multilateral security agreements, which in turn provide structure for the regional security architecture for the Boe Declaration.

However, we are all familiar with the plethora of policies that die because they either did not deliver real outputs or were inadequately invested in. When this happens nationally, it also affects sub-regional and regional outcomes.

Investing in foundational work to implement national security strategies helps to produce tangible outcomes for the communities they are designed to safeguard. But how do we measure their impact on our quality of life and security?

This is why I argue that national security strategies, and the sub-regional and regional advancement of security they underpin, must incorporate mechanisms for assessing performance and tracking progress.

We all want to see our region prosper but this won’t happen if there’s no plan for implementing policy. Such plans should include monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks, with budgets and clear goals.

In December 2026, Cook Islands will review its national security policy for the first time, based on a performance assessment framework designed to measure its effectiveness. Vanuatu and Samoa reviewed their national security strategies in 2022 and 2023 respectively, using metrics from targeted action plans and aligned to national sustainable development plans.

When national security strategies have clear M&E frameworks, it is possible to show and track progress on regional and sub-regional commitments to the Boe Declaration and Ocean of Peace.

Importantly, national security strategies in the Pacific do not operate in isolation of national sustainable development plans and priorities. Their measures of progress are intertwined. Fiji’s National Security Strategy is a prime example of this.

In this way, Pacific security policies and strategies reflect the epitome of the Boe Declaration: they bridge traditional and non-traditional security priorities – including development – by treating them as important to national security.

If sub-regional security strategies like the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) draft are developed, they need to include an operational plan and clear measures of progress. They must also avoid duplication and build on existing national policies and systems. The MSG is well-positioned in that four of its countries – Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu – already have national security policies. The MSG also already has a meeting mechanism for discussing policy implementation, which is invaluable for tracking progress.

But talk must be followed by action. And action must show positive impact for Pacific peoples.

Associate Professor Henry Ivarature is the Deputy Director of the Pacific Security College.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

Sub-regional strategies, such as the draft Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) security strategy, reflect a shift toward layered or nested security architecture in the Pacific.

In a nested system, the sub-regional frameworks complement and advance the objectives of broader regional security agendas.

This architecture could enable regional commitments articulated in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent to be translated into more targeted, context-specific actions in the Melanesian countries. This could enhance policy ownership, improve coordination, and enable practical cooperation through intelligence-sharing, joint maritime surveillance and coordinated law enforcement.

However, these benefits are contingent on how effectively two key challenges are managed.

The first challenge is alignment between sub-regional and regional priorities. While MSG initiatives broadly reflect regional concerns on transnational crime, national threat profiles differ.

In Solomon Islands, threats centre on illegal logging, drug trafficking, and corruption. While this aligns with regional priorities, the country is constrained by weak enforcement capacity.

In Vanuatu, risks are concentrated in financial and cyber domains, requiring specialised regulatory responses that may be under-emphasised in broader frameworks.

In Papua New Guinea, transnational crime is embedded in extractive sectors, with the country’s grey listing by the Financial Action Task Force highlighting gaps between compliance and enforcement. PNG also struggles with containing tribal violence and the widespread use of modern weaponry in these conflicts, to a greater extent than the three members of MSG.

Meanwhile, Fiji faces escalating drug trafficking challenges. It has evolved from a transit hub into a domestic market and is experiencing a rise in HIV/AIDs cases because of needle sharing.

The second challenge is fragmentation. Without careful design, MSG initiatives risk duplicating regional mechanisms and straining limited national capacities. Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, for instance, have smaller GDPs compared to PNG.

PNG’s challenges are far greater than the other members of MSG, but this also presents an opportunity: a differentiated approach. Tailored strategies – maritime governance in Solomon Islands, financial regulation in Vanuatu, enforcement capacity in PNG, and drug control in Fiji – can ensure that sub-regional cooperation complements, rather than homogenises, diverse national priorities.

Michael Kabuni is a PhD candidate at the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University (ANU) and a Pacific Security College PhD scholarship recipient. 

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

I approach this question from two angles.

Firstly, how might sub-regional security approaches straddle the development-peace-security nexus demanded by the Boe Declaration on Regional Security?

In 2023, Melanesia became the first of the Pacific’s three sub-regions to begin developing a sub-regional security strategy. It’s currently awaiting endorsement by the five-member Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). It has roots in the MSG 2038 – Prosperity for All Plan and has taken shape across nearly a decade of MSG working group meetings.

The intent is sub-regional alignment and complementarity, rather than duplication. In September 2025, Fiji Policing Minister Ioane Naivalurua indicated that the MSG’s sub-regional contribution will “create an arc of stability across our region”.

He cited the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and drew on the MSG 2038 Plan, as a reminder that development is crucial for peace and security.

Supporting the most vulnerable

Alignment with Pacific efforts to address development inequalities for the most marginalised groups should be at the heart of any peace and security strategy.

In 2025, the Micronesian Islands Forum endorsed a Micronesian Gender Equality Framework. Current MSG Secretariat consultations for a gender and social inclusion framework also aim to tackle concerning rates of gender-based violence in Melanesia. An average of two out of three women suffer violence in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; and there are high rates of sorcery-related violence in Papua New Guinea.

These efforts bring valued attention to the intersection of development and human security work. These initiatives require budgets at the same level as hard security matters such as border security and transnational crime.

Alternative peace and security models

The MSG 2038 Plan emphasises sustained investment in peacebuilding through working with community structures.

The national security strategies of several MSG member countries reference the importance of working with customary governance, and ‘whole-of-nation’ approaches to bridging community and national needs on peace and security.

It’s likely an MSG sub-regional strategy would also incorporate these themes. This is an approach the Boe Declaration Action Plan has not yet considered. Extending the peace and security ecosystem beyond state structures is a lesson that could be instructive for Pacific regional security policy evolution.

A matter of accountability

The second angle to the overarching question relates to accountability. How can sub-regions support and align with Pacific-wide security strategies, especially while keeping the Boe Declaration’s people-centred principles in mind?

Sub-regional governance arrangements vary across the Pacific. The MSG and the Micronesian Islands Forum (MIF) have permanent secretariats while the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) is advancing a common charter. Each of these arrangements produces political declarations in which commitment to the themes of Boe Declaration are regularly reaffirmed – such as cooperation on health and human security, transnational crime and cybersecurity.

Consistent, high-level reaffirmation of Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)-centred security principles maintains valued sub-regional attention on broader cooperation efforts. It also extends PIF-centric concepts beyond the region’s core political membership, reaching countries and territories that primarily engage in sub-regional spaces.

Of note in the Micronesian and Polynesian arrangements is the inclusion of non-independent groups from the United States and French territories, such as American Samoa, Guahån, and Wallis and Futuna, where their membership status in relation to the PIF is that of ‘associate’.

This raises a question about the expectations of those beyond core membership under the PIF, and whether their roles and contributions to regional security cooperation might be better realised at a sub-regional level.

In the case of the MSG, its sole associate member – Indonesia – has been a key financier of the sub-regional dialogue on MSG security strategy. It is also included in – and likely also accountable to – future arrangements. But unlike the larger catchment of the MIF and PLG, whose members are also PIF associate members, Indonesia holds a different status as a PIF Dialogue Partner. The political status of French Polynesia, New Caledonia, American Samoa, and Guahån, bring their respective colonial powers – PIF Dialogue Partners France and the USA – into the security equation. Military competencies are not devolved, nor likely to ever be in the current geopolitical climate.

The Ocean of Peace declaration provides an entry point to reconcile the different sub-regional associations of those beyond a core PIF membership.

However to underpin greater accountability to the Blue Pacific Way, its implementation plan will need to further articulate the structures and processes by which sub-regional security architectures are recognised in a PIF-centred regional security architecture.

Dr Anna Naupa is a Research and Engagement Fellow (Pacific Security) at the Pacific Security College.

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Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.