Stronger regional cooperation will be critical as the Pacific shifts from decision-making to implementation to address the region’s security challenges, the Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue 2026 Report highlights.

Drawing on insights from the Pacific’s largest gathering of the security community, the report brings together perspectives from leaders, officials, experts, and civil society, church and community representatives on the security challenges facing the region and possible responses.

The Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue 2026, held in June, discussed priority security issues in the region, including economic security, the energy transition, transnational crime, and mobility.

One of the Dialogue organisers, Professor Dave Peebles, Director of the Pacific Security College, said the report was a valuable reflection of the insights of delegates from across the region, bringing together their individual experiences and perspectives.

“A recurring message throughout the Dialogue was that we are stronger together, and that regional unity and cooperation are critical to addressing security challenges, many of which are having significant impacts on Pacific communities, such as the drug crisis and climate change,” he said.

“One of the Dialogue’s greatest strengths is that it brings together a range of perspectives, including those that are not always part of security discussions.

“This report demonstrates the value of that diversity and offers holistic, integrated and forward-looking insights and recommendations for the region.”

The Dialogue included two days of panel discussions on different security issues and a futures exercise during which participants explored the potential futures for the Pacific in 2045 and 2060. The exercise also included the identification of priority actions to address security challenges, which are reflected in the report.

Pacific Security College Senior Fellow Joel Nilon said a key theme across the report was the need to improve implementation.

“At the Dialogue, there was recognition of the important work done to build the foundations of effective policy responses, such as the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration. Participants identified that the next step is to translate these commitments into practical action and effective implementation,” Mr Nilon said.

“The report reflects on the opportunities and challenges before the region and captures a range of ideas and actions that could contribute to a peaceful, resilient and secure Pacific.”

The Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue 2026 Report outlines key insights, observations and recommendations from the panel discussions and futures exercise, including:

Regionalism: Regional approaches and collective responses are important to a peaceful and secure Pacific. Delegates identified the need to develop stronger regional institutions, and to strengthen regional architecture through alignment, reciprocity and mutual recognition of national policies.

Geopolitical competition: While dialogue participants recognised geopolitical competition as one of several pressures facing the region alongside climate change and transnational crime, they emphasised that the Pacific needs to continue to deal with geopolitical competition on its own terms, rather than allowing external strategic competition to determine the region’s security agenda.

Security responses: The Dialogue heard that security must remain people-centred and regional responses must focus on the lived realities of Pacific Island Countries. Members of the region need to protect their sovereign ability to act in their own interests.

Climate action: Greater support and funding is needed for climate change resilience and adaptation, and the region needs to ensure the sustainable cultivation of natural resources.

Inclusive security: The Dialogue heard that human security underpinned prosperity in the Pacific and must include food and water security, health and support for ageing, disability and mental health. Participants encouraged regional approaches for achieving food and water security to reduce reliance on global supply chains.

Economic security: Greater investment in people, including women and youth, can support economic growth and resilience. More thinking outside the box is needed, focusing on diversification and innovation, including exploring opportunities to harness the digital economy.

Cyber safety for communities: Coordinated action supported by stronger regulation, digital literacy and public awareness is required to address risks including cyberbullying, online misogyny, gender-based violence, privacy breaches, harmful online content, and the targeting of vulnerable groups.

Fighting transnational crime: Regional intelligence sharing arrangements need to deliver real-time data and actionable intelligence. A regional approach to capability development, including shared centres of excellence in digital forensics and financial investigation, would strengthen collective effectiveness, as would further alignment of legal frameworks, mutual legal assistance and extradition processes.

Energy transition: The Dialogue heard that while the region has many of the policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks needed to support the energy transition, implementation remains a key challenge. The creation of a Pacific Regional Renewable Energy Commissioner would improve regional cohesion and guide the Pacific towards becoming a leader in the use of renewable energy.

Pacific mobility: Future mobility and adaptation practices should be approached in ways that draw upon Pacific values, customary systems and community leadership.

Inclusion of youth voices: Young people should have a permanent seat at the table in discussions related to regional peace and security processes, futures and foresight work, implementation and monitoring, and broader regional decision-making.

The Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue 2026 Report is available online.

Conference statement

2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue

The Grand Pacific Hotel / Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

Suva, Fiji

15 – 17 June 2026

Overview

1. In a spirit of cooperation and unity, the Pacific peace and security community gathered for the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue, in Suva, Fiji from 15 to 17 June 2026.

2. The Dialogue brought together political and official-level representatives from across the Pacific Islands Forum membership, as well as senior leaders from partner regional organisations, including the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA); Joint Heads of Pacific Security Secretariat (JHOPS); Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG); Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO); Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC); the Pacific Community (SPC); Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO); Pacific Fusion Centre (PFC); Pacific Immigration Development Community (PIDC); Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP); Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Network (PILON); Pacific Security College (PSC); the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP); and the University of the South Pacific (USP) – highlighting the strength, breadth and solidarity of the Pacific’s peace and security architecture.

3. The Dialogue also brought together a significant number of senior representatives from universities and research institutions from across the Pacific including: the University of the South Pacific; the Auckland University of Technology; the Australian National University; the College of Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia); the College of the Marshall Islands; Fiji National University; Lowy Institute; the National University of Samoa; the National University of Vanuatu; Palau Community College; Pasifika Communities University; Solomon Islands National University; Tonga National University; the University of Auckland; the University of Canterbury; the University of Papua New Guinea; Papua New Guinea National Research Institute; Tangintebu Theological College; and the Compass Point Institute.

4. The Dialogue also welcomed numerous representatives from civil society, the media, youth, faith-based and community-based groups from across the Pacific, further reflecting the breadth of stakeholders who contribute to the Pacific’s expanded concept of security as set out in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security.

5. The Dialogue was honoured to welcome His Excellency Dr Chem Widhya, Secretary-General of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), and Ms Elizabeth Solomon, Assistant Secretary-General for Foreign and Community Relations at the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat. Participants valued the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Southeast Asia and the Caribbean in advancing regional cooperation, collective diplomacy, and institution-building in an increasingly complex global environment.

6. At the same time the Dialogue was privileged to welcome three former Secretaries General of the Pacific Islands Forum: Mr Henry Puna, Dame Meg Taylor and Tuiloma Neroni Slade. Their presence reflected the continuity in Pacific regionalism and provided a valuable reminder of the leadership, vision and commitment that has shaped the Forum and the wider regional architecture over many decades.

7. The Dialogue recognised that all participants – including youth, women, faith-based organisations, traditional leaders, civil society, universities, and communities – are not peripheral actors, but essential parts of the Pacific peace and security architecture.

Strategic context

8. The Honourable Simon Kofe, Minister for Transport, Energy, Communication and Innovation in the Government of Tuvalu, provided the opening keynote address. He urged that Pacific regionalism be grounded in the Pacific’s vision and core values as reflected in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. He highlighted how challenges such as climate change, transnational crime, technological disruption, and geopolitical competition are not only security issues but also tests of leadership, governance, unity, and collective responsibility.

9. His address underscored that fragmentation remains a strategic vulnerability and he called for stronger regional cooperation, harmonisation and information sharing. Minister Kofe also noted that trust was a vital element in deepening regional cooperation. Drawing lessons from successful Pacific initiatives, he emphasised that sovereignty is strengthened through collective action and that lasting security depends on resilient communities, trusted institutions, effective governance, environmental stewardship, and a shared commitment to Pacific values and future generations.

10. Complementing these remarks, Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Baron Waqa highlighted the need for the region’s collective peace and security efforts to remain aligned, united and effective. He reminded the Dialogue that the review of the regional security architecture, and the development of the region’s peace and security action plan, would be central to these efforts. The Secretary General stressed that implementation and delivery of regional declarations and policies was now critical to bringing about long-lasting peace and security across the region.

11. In his address, Professor Transform Aqorau, Vice Chancellor of the Solomon Islands National University, challenged participants to consider the future of the Pacific through the eyes of the generations to come, who would inherit the region in 2050, underscoring the long-term implications of today’s decisions. He emphasised that while the Pacific has developed strong regional frameworks, including the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, the priority now is implementation, collective action, and sustained regional leadership. Drawing on examples of Pacific agency such as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement, Professor Aqorau highlighted the importance of self-reliance, solidarity and Pacific-led solutions across climate action, ocean governance, and security. His remarks emphasised that peace and security must be people-centred, ocean-centred, and future-facing. His remarks also underscored the importance of the continued development of the Ocean of Peace as a practical doctrine bringing together law, diplomacy, ocean governance, climate security and demilitarisation, leading to strengthened Pacific agency.

Security threats and responses

12. During the Political leaders on challenges and opportunity panel, participants were reminded of the deteriorating global environment, the intensifying polycrisis and the weakening rules-based order. The Dialogue heard that security must remain people-centred and regional responses must continue to focus on concerns that relate to the lived realities of Pacific Island countries. The Dialogue also heard that the Pacific could be proud of the long-standing impact that its voice had in shaping rules and norms, including on oceans and nuclear issues, and on climate change advocacy. In making the most of the Pacific’s opportunities, speakers emphasised that trust was a vital ingredient for governments in managing security challenges, and that there was a need for a strong focus on the implementation and delivery of regional mandates and policies.

13. In the Political leaders on economic security panel, the Dialogue heard that economic security is not separate to broader peace and security – but a core element of it, with economic resilience a foundation for stability and sovereignty across the region. Economic security issues such as fuel shocks, debt stress, employment constraints, infrastructure gaps, and cost-of-living pressures can quickly become social and political security issues, which require that economic resilience sit at the centre of the region’s security agenda. Participants also heard about the potential economic benefits to Pacific Island countries of closer coordination and pooling of resources.

14. In the Society, peace and security panel, participants recognised that the rapid growth of digital technologies has brought significant social and economic benefits to Pacific communities, while also creating new and evolving cyber safety challenges. The discussion highlighted the need for coordinated action to address risks including cyberbullying, online misogyny, gender-based violence, privacy breaches, harmful online content, and the targeting of vulnerable groups such as women, girls, youth and older persons. The Dialogue heard that a whole-of-society approach involving government, industry, civil society, media, legal practitioners and communities, supported by stronger regulation, digital literacy and public awareness was required. More broadly, the Dialogue noted the ongoing need to recognise the link between digital safety and public trust, democratic resilience, and social cohesion.

15. In the Regional cooperation in the Pacific and beyond panel participants reflected on the importance of regionalism as a foundation for peace, security and prosperity, drawing on experiences from the Pacific, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. It was also recognised that regionalism strengthens sovereignty when it helps its member states act collectively on shared priorities. Further, the Dialogue heard that effective regional cooperation is grounded in shared values, unity and solidarity, based on trust and a commitment to collective action. The experiences of ASEAN and CARICOM offered encouragement for the Pacific Islands Forum: ASEAN’s decades-long effort to preserve peace through dialogue, rules and consensus had demonstrated the value of regional structures that endure under the pressure of geopolitical tension. CARICOM’s experience showed how small states can amplify their influence through collective diplomacy, shared institutions and coordinated advocacy including on issues such as climate change and international financial reform.

16. In the Regional and community cooperation to fight transnational organised crime session, the Dialogue heard that transnational organised crime poses an escalating threat across the Pacific, with increasing narcotics trafficking and use, alongside money laundering, online scams and identity theft. While acknowledging the successes of law enforcement agencies in disrupting criminal networks, participants recognised that organised crime groups continue to adapt rapidly, exploiting capacity constraints and the region’s vast maritime geography. Panellists emphasised that law enforcement alone cannot address the growing challenge of transnational organised crime, and underscored the need for a coordinated, whole-of-society approach that brings together governments, law enforcement agencies, health and education sectors, civil society, communities, faith-based organisations, and the private sector. This approach should integrate intelligence-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, prevention, public awareness, early intervention, treatment, and harm reduction measures. Participants also expressed concern about the growing social and public health impacts associated with illicit drug use, including addiction, the spread of HIV, mental health challenges, and broader harms to families and communities.

17. In the Regional cooperation for the energy transition session, the Dialogue heard about the importance of accelerating the Pacific energy transition, particularly given worsening climate change impacts and the current heavy reliance on fossil fuels, the global energy supply shock, and enduring supply chain challenges. The Dialogue also recognised the renewable energy transition as a sovereignty-building measure for the Pacific. Regarding the current fuel crisis, participants heard the crisis had received high-level attention at national and regional levels, including through Forum Leaders’ invoking of the Biketawa Declaration, while there was also a call for greater clarity on a sequenced regional response: identifying immediate actions to address current fuel-related pressures; medium-term measures to strengthen coordination and resilience; and longer-term pathways beyond the Biketawa Declaration response to advance energy security. It was also noted lower socioeconomic groups were most affected. More generally, participants heard the region had in place much of the necessary enabling environment for the energy transition, particularly in terms of policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks, but that implementation of the transition remained the key challenge.

18. In the Regional cooperation for Pacific mobility, dignity and adaptation panel the Dialogue reflected on the central place of mobility in Pacific societies, recognising its historical roots across the Pacific, as well as its growing significance in the context of labour migration, demographic change, and climate change impacts. Panellists highlighted the diverse factors driving mobility, including access to education and employment opportunities, as well as environmental and political considerations. Participants further considered the complex challenges associated with increasing mobility, including brain drain, social division, urbanisation, gendered social relations, forced return and changing border and visa arrangements, while also acknowledging the opportunities presented through diaspora engagement, economic opportunity and digital connectivity. The Dialogue recognised that future mobility and adaptation practices should be approached in ways that draw upon Pacific values, customary systems and community leadership. The Falepili Union was also an important topic in the discussion.

19. In the Land as security: national and regional cooperation panel participants discussed the central role of land as a foundation of peace, security, identity and resilience across the Pacific. It was noted that customary land tenure systems continue to underpin social cohesion, cultural continuity, food security and community wellbeing throughout the region. At the same time, pressures arising from climate change, disaster displacement, urbanisation, demographic change and historical legacies are increasing demands on land, creating new sources of vulnerability and conflict, if not carefully managed. Panellists emphasised the importance of traditional governance systems, customary leadership, reconciliation processes and community relationships in maintaining social harmony and supporting adaptation. They also highlighted the need to strengthen the integration of customary knowledge, education, research and policy development, while recognising the value and rich traditions of Pacific approaches to mobility, relocation and community support.

Youth and the future

20. The session Looking ahead: today’s youth on a secure future for the Blue Pacific comprised of a group of young Pacific thinkers who discussed what was required to realise the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The panel emphasised the next generation would inherit a complex range of intersecting threats such as climate change, the spread and impact of drugs, and social media and artificial intelligence. Based on this, they highlighted that youth should have a permanent seat at the table in discussions related to regional peace and security processes, futures and foresight work, implementation and monitoring, and broader regional decision making. While the panel was realistic about the challenges the region faced into the future, there was also optimism that the Pacific’s values of respect, humility, loyalty and stewardship of the environment would continue to guide it through the difficult years to come.

21. The Futures Exercise delivered through the partnership between the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Security College (PSC), was an opportunity for participants to consider future scenarios and develop a range of potential policy and operational level options to ensure the region would remain on track to deliver on the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The Dialogue recognised the importance of futures and foresight methods, and encourages their use in national security strategies, regional planning, leadership training, youth engagement, and institutional capacity-building. The Dialogue also acknowledged the speakers who opened the day and inspired us with their vision for 2050, and the national security leaders who closed the day with their reflections, including on next steps.

Regional peace and security architecture

Peace and security action plan

22. Participants heard the Regional Peace and Security Action Plan 2026-2030 would be completed in 2026, and it would be a critical part of translating regional security commitments into coordinated and practical action. The Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General also highlighted the Action Plan would be a key mechanism for strengthening collaboration among regional agencies, improving the alignment of national and regional priorities, and ensuring resources were directed towards the region’s most pressing security challenges. Across the Dialogue, participants heard about the importance of political leadership, financing, institutional capacity, legal and policy alignment, training, data, monitoring, and accountability, as being critical elements in the successful delivery of the Action Plan. Further, the Dialogue also recognised that implementation was a decisive test.

National security strategies

23. A number of Forum member representatives highlighted the benefit of having national security strategies, and it was reported the national security strategies in place had increased – from three in 2018 to 11 in 2025 – with others being worked on, and some of the initial strategies being reviewed and renewed. To that end, participants congratulated Tonga for the launch of its national security policy and looked forward to the launch of further strategies by other Forum members this year. The Dialogue also recognised there may be value in promoting peer learning across Forum member countries when it comes to the development, review and refreshing of national security policies and related work. The Dialogue also recognised the National Security Coordinator’s roundtable as a potential central point for this activity.

Role of the Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue

24. Participants reflected that the Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue was an important convening in the broader regional security architecture that critically brought together a broad cross-section of the region’s peace and security community. Participants urged its continuation into the future and believed there was an opportunity to link it to the wider regional security architecture, and for its outcomes to be explicitly connected to broader regional peace and security policy processes – including the Regional Peace and Security Action Plan 2026-2030.

Looking forward

25. In supporting the ongoing finalisation of the Regional Peace and Security Action Plan 2026-2030, the Dialogue underscored the importance of ensuring that the Action Plan was practical, implementation-focused, and capable of translating regional commitments into tangible outcomes for Pacific peoples. Participants highlighted several cross-cutting priorities for consideration, including:

• strengthening political leadership and regional coordination
• reinforcing implementation capacity at national and regional levels
• promoting whole-of-society partnerships that engage government, community, civil society, faith-based organisations, youth, women, academia and the private sector
• improving information-sharing, research, and futures and foresight capabilities
• embedding monitoring, evaluation and accountability mechanisms
• ensuring the Action Plan remains sufficiently flexible to respond to emerging and interconnected security challenges.

26. Above all, the Dialogue reaffirmed that the success of the Action Plan will depend not only on the quality of its design, but on sustained commitment to its collective implementation across the region.

Conclusion

27. The Dialogue participants and organisers sincerely thank the Government and people of Fiji for their warm hospitality and support.

28. We also sincerely thank Secretary General Waqa and the Forum Secretariat team for making the Forum Secretariat’s facilities available for the conference, and for their broader support to the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue.

What lessons does the history of our Blue Pacific hold to safeguard and future-proof an Ocean of Peace towards 2050? Dr Marco de Jong reflects on Pacific regionalism in a provocation at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue.

Any good Western academically trained historian would never deem to draw lessons from the past, however walking backwards into the future, living with ancestors, venerating the words of elders, we in the region are not so encumbered.

And indeed, the 2050 Strategy and the Blue Pacific narrative were informed and inspired by the historic achievements of our Pacific regionalism: the Law of the Sea negotiations that secured extended maritime jurisdiction commensurate with any continent; the Parties to the Nauru Agreement, which ensured equitable benefit from the world’s largest sustainable tuna fishery; and the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 14, to conserve our ‘life below water’.

Lessons from Pacific regionalism

The first point I want to make is historiographical and it comes with an appeal to deepen our institutional memory.

So to that reference list, we might add the less celebrated Noumea Convention, the preamble of which is unique amongst regional seas conventions for recognising “the traditions and cultures of Pacific people”, our commitment to future generations, and “the special hydrological, geological and ecological characteristics of the region [requiring] special care and responsible management”. When negotiated, this compelled the United States to cede their ‘rights’ to dump low level nuclear waste in the high seas pockets of the Convention area despite not being party to UNCLOS. This tremendous achievement goes largely unheralded.

Further, by working through Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme, the region gained recognition – at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 – of the “special case” of Small Island Developing States within the UN system. This enabled the structure for climate action through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and ultimately the crowning achievement of the 1.5-degree threshold in the Paris Agreement.

Together, these constitute our Blue Pacific regime of ocean governance, codify our expanded security, and undergird our Ocean of Peace.

But the lesson here is not only for advancing integration or the strong moral voice. It’s also about building strength from our diversity, it’s about knowing our leverage, it’s about adopting a strategy of mutual reinforcement and coordination across multiple inter- and subregional avenues, and show solidarity not sameness.

Security through de-escalation

We have also heard how this year marks the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga; how it stands as the foremost expression of a regional commitment to peace; and how we might be inspired to revitalise and further operationalise it to meet contemporary challenges.

It is worth remembering, however, that what became the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was originally tabled a decade earlier, at the Nuku’alofa Forum in 1975. This, coincidentally, marked the first time regional security appeared on the formal leaders’ agenda.

A paper by Tonga described the possibility of external subversion, prompting a broader debate about cultural and economic security, and the summary record includes the broad conclusion that “the present absence of an overt military threat, [meant] the best assurance of security and stability [lay] in continued economic and social development”. Our concept of expanded security was there from the beginning.

Of course, concerns about a growing Soviet maritime presence culminated in the infamous Soviet Scare of 1976, which formalised the policy of regional strategic denial within ANZUS. This dynamic continues to animate regional security, with the link between economic development, political stability, and what is termed ‘the sentiment of belonging to a Western-aligned security community’ utilised to block Eastern opportunities for regional influence by our metropolitan partners.

My second historical point, and further appeal is for Australia and New Zealand to take a more creative approach to regional security and, if they must, adopt a less rigid, community approach to strategic denial.

Attempting to lock down the region bilaterally and militarily is counterproductive and risks creating the insecurity it seeks to address. I say this with reference to the debates within ANZUS during the 1970s, which declassified and accessible, and reveal the strategic intent of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

New Zealand explained its support for SPNFZ by stating that “the Indian Ocean had become an area of strategic confrontation between the great powers and the establishment of a nuclear free zone would be a way of declaring the opposition of the Pacific countries to the wholesale deployment of nuclear weapons”. The word deployment is key and it’s notable this occurred as the United States was withdrawing from Vietnam and concerns arose in ANZUS about its regional resolve and attendant security guarantee.

The implication from NZ was that when major powers are unreliable, deescalation offers greater security for middle powers than attempts to draw smaller states into tight alignment with a favoured bloc, which would only invite further spiralling competition. Thus, regional disarmament agreements offer small states strategic value by insulating them from contestation and preserving collective agency. In this new era of rivalry, the region might look to this historic example.

New megatrends of concern

Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate how technology is once again reshaping the conduct of war, most often in ways that are deeply inhumane, and in the Pacific we should be conscious of how this shifts our own strategic relevance for major powers.

My last point builds on the weaponisation of emerging domains, like space, cyber, and the undersea, and assets like undersea cables, ground-based space infrastructure and seabed critical minerals.

I want to discuss networked warfare and the proliferation risks, especially of uncrewed maritime systems, or sea drones. Because these systems are deliberately destabilising, highly networked, often autonomous, and potentially lethal, they challenge coastal states’ rights across all maritime spaces and threaten a regional commitment to peace and disarmament.

The status of uncrewed maritime systems and lethal autonomous weapons systems at international law is unsettled. Under UNCLOS, it is not clear whether sea drones qualify as ships or warships or what corresponding rights and obligations they have in territorial seas or the broader EEZ with regards to innocent passage, strategic intelligence gathering, or scientific research.

Similarly, under international humanitarian law, there is ongoing debate over whether weapons capable of selecting and applying force to targets without human intervention can reliably distinguish military from civilian targets or adhere to principles of proportionality.

Pacific nations, to the extent that they want to adopt drone technologies, are unlikely to support lethal systems.

To date, Australia and New Zealand are the only Forum members currently operating sea drones, most notably in the form of the Anduril Ghost Shark, which is an uncrewed submarine with a strike capability, and the Ocius BlueBottle, which resembles a solar-powered sailboat for persistence surveillance.

Recently, New Zealand and Fiji conducted a joint military operation, Calypso, on transnational crime that featured the latter. While the application of drones here is largely benign, given the unsettled legal issues and strategic interest in preserving coastal states’ control, Pacific nations should nonetheless be wary of setting precedents or fragmenting consent.

Thinking to history, and as with Rarotonga, the issue is deployment. Regional access becomes a key source of collective leverage, and Pacific nations have a pressing interest in setting pre-emptive norms, lest our waters become the site of escalating confrontation.

The Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration contains operative language around “promoting the responsible use of technology and innovation”, which might provide a basis for the further development of safeguards that allow Pacific nations access to useful technologies without sacrificing the ability to regulate them.

My hope is that such work might be a concrete historically informed contribution to future-proof the Ocean of Peace towards 2050.

Dr Marco de Jong is a Pacific historian and a Lecturer at Auckland University of Technology Law School. This article is a lightly edited version of an address delivered at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue.

Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

A recent discussion on regional mobility highlighted the need for mobility pathways that uphold dignity, protect sovereignty and expand opportunities for Pacific peoples, writes Dr Akka Rimon.

Security in the Pacific is increasingly defined by climate pressures, socioeconomic shifts and environmental changes—forces that are reshaping daily realities across the region. Within this evolving landscape, mobility has emerged as one of security’s most contested dimensions: who moves, how, why and under what conditions. It sits at the heart of regional debates, acting as both a connector and a source of tension across communities.

This topic anchored a panel at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue, featuring the Hon Simon Kofe, Tuvalu’s Minister for Transport, Energy, Communication and Innovation; Professor Yvonne Underhill-Sem of the University of Auckland; and Dr Henrietta McNeill-Stowers from the Australian National University.

Together, the panellists explored mobility’s deep cultural and historical roots, and its growing relevance amid labour migration, demographic change and climate change impacts.

The drivers of mobility today

Opening the discussion, Minister Kofe said that Tuvalu mobility today is shaped by longstanding pressures—environmental stress, resource scarcity, and aspirations for better education and employment opportunities – which have driven movement across generations and created structural issues the country must confront.

Professor Underhill-Sem highlighted an often-overlooked driver: curiosity, which shapes movement between villages and islands as an integral part of Pacific life. She pointed to the legacy of service-based mobility, particularly through wartime deployments, which have leaving lasting imprints on regional peace and security. Today’s mobility patterns, she noted, are more gendered with increasing participation of women while impacts of mobility are also being experienced in distinct ways.

Dr McNeill-Stowers reframed mobility through the lens of return, arguing that dignified mobility must encompass the ability to return home. Her research on deportations demonstrates that rising nationalism, stricter border regimes and coercive deportation practices have made return mobility a critical security concern requiring a whole-of-nation reintegration approach.

Staying or leaving?

At the 2026 State of the Pacific conference earlier this year, former prime minister of Samoa Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa posed the question of whether countries were creating conditions that enabled their people to have meaningful lives at home.

Responding to this provocation, Professor Underhill-Sem cautioned against the uncritical use of the Triple Win narrative in labour mobility. Drawing from her research across the region, she said that while remittances and returning skills have transformed communities, the inequities in schemes like New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) program concentrate opportunities, fracture social cohesion, and risk allowing governments to neglect building viable economies at home.

Dr McNeill-Stowers extended this discussion by foregrounding the structural implications of large-scale outward mobility, noting that remittances must be understood alongside labour shortages, service gaps and vulnerabilities that arise when essential workers are overseas, especially during crises.

Minister Kofe positioned the provocation as a reminder for Pacific leaders to make home environments more attractive and viable, clarifying that the Falepili Treaty aims to expand choices rather than facilitate escape. He emphasised the need for incentives to retain skilled workers, pathways for diaspora return and innovations like the Digital Nation initiative to enable meaningful participation in national development from afar.

Protecting identity and belonging

The Pacific Guidance on Internal Planned Relocation emphasises that relocation must be people-centred and rights based, and that land issues must be resolved in ways that protect identity and belonging. The speakers agreed the guidance reflects core Pacific principles such as people-centred decision making, protection of rights and the safeguarding of identity and land, but each stressed that applying these principles in practice is far more complex.

Professor Underhill-Sem attests that mobility and land have long been negotiated and relational, with communities historically moving in response to environmental and political change, making planned relocation inseparable from deeper histories of belonging.

Rights-based, people-centred approaches must apply to all forms of mobility, said Dr McNeill-Stowers, noting that most movement is internal, unplanned and driven by necessity. Communities overwhelmingly want to remain connected to place, requiring community-led decisions and strong support systems, she said.

Minister Kofe emphasised that people must remain at the heart of any relocation or mobility policy, highlighting the cultural shock of moving abroad. He described the Digital Nation as a practical tool for safeguarding identity, heritage and continuity for Tuvaluans across generations and geographies.

Security and mobility

While mobility has long shaped Pacific politics, recent bilateral security agreements are now reshaping mobility in new ways.

Dr McNeill-Stowers emphasised the need to distinguish new agreements, emerging since 2017 amid heightened geopolitical competition, from longstanding frameworks enabling migration such as the Compact of Free Association or New Zealand’s free association with the Cook Islands and Niue. She said mobility was increasingly used as a bargaining tool and noted that Pacific leaders have consistently called for easier visa access. As a result, mobility provisions have become leveraged in new security deals, from Tuvalu’s Falepili Union to Vanuatu’s Nakamal Agreement, and even the expansion of Solomon Islands’ Pacific Engagement Visa share. She highlighted the Falepili Union as a model that enables dignified mobility, without requiring proof of climate harm.

Minister Kofe offered insight into Tuvalu’s negotiations over the Falepili Treaty, acknowledging early concerns about sovereignty, but explained how these were resolved through an explanatory memorandum that ensured national interests remained protected.

In sum, the discussions made one thing clear: that mobility is a continuum shaped by opportunity, risk, climate pressures, labour demands, demographic change and shifting geopolitics.

As the region confronts new mobility frameworks, amid emerging security agreements and intensifying economic and climate shocks, the challenge is not choosing between staying or leaving, but continually reviewing mobility settings to determine how security can be achieved through present day movement that upholds dignity, protects sovereignty, and strengthens futures Pacific peoples seek for themselves.

Dr Akka Rimon is a Research and Engagement Fellow at the Pacific Security College. This blog draws on insights shared during a panel on mobility at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue. A recording of the panel discussion is available here.

Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

At the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue, Sainimili Tawake offered a provocation on the future of peace and security in the Pacific, calling for persons with disabilities to be seen as central actors in shaping the region’s peace, security and development agendas.

I believe all of us want a future that is peaceful, resilient and inclusive.

We want a Pacific that embraces persons with disabilities and their issues, one where every person can live in dignity, safety, and with a lot of opportunities. But to realise that future we must ensure that persons with disabilities are treated not as an afterthought – they must be recognised as a central pillar to our peace and security agenda.

From the Pacific Disability Forum’s perspective, three things must happen.

First, we must embed disability equity and inclusion across the Blue Pacific 2050 agenda and all its processes, particularly within the peace and security space.

The 2050 strategy speaks to human security, climate resilience, inclusive development, and people-centered governance. Disability cuts across all these priorities. This means we must build inclusive disaster preparedness and response systems, invest in accessible infrastructures and services, recognise persons with disabilities as agents of peacebuilding, and ensure disability data is evidenced and reflected in every planning framework.

We must also recognise the growing burden of diabetes across the Pacific as both a public health challenge and a disability inclusion issue. Diabetes is increasingly contributing to preventable disability through amputation and vision loss, kidney failure, and other long-term complications, especially where early diagnosis, treatment, and foot care remain limited.

We need to scale up prevention, screening and early diagnosis at community level, expand access to affordable treatment, rehabilitation and assistive technology and services, invest in foot and eye care and kidney care, and ensure diabetes-related disability is reflected in health disability and social protection planning. Persons with disabilities who acquire diabetes must be effectively included in this prevention process.

We must also acknowledge the growing illicit drug crisis across the Pacific, particularly its impact on young people and on already stretched mental health services. Rising drug use is contributing to addiction, psychosocial distress, violence and contact with the justice system, while placing unsustainable pressure on psychiatric institutions and frontline health services.

This is also contributing to a rise in the number of persons with psychosocial disabilities, many of whom face stigma, exclusion and very limited pathways to support and recovery.

The challenge is compounded by the fact that there are only four organisations of persons with psychosocial disabilities across the region, leaving a significant gap in peer support, advocacy and community-based response.

Our response must be to strengthen prevention, early intervention and awareness for children, youth and families; expand access to community-based mental health addiction treatment and psychosocial support, and build stronger pathways to recovery, inclusion, and reintegration.

We must invest in organisations of persons with psychosocial disabilities, and coordinate law enforcement, health, education and social protection, so the burden does not fall on psychiatric institutions alone.

Second, we must fully implement the refreshed Pacific Regional Framework on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This framework is critical because it translates global commitments, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, into Pacific realities. That means strengthening national implementation mechanisms, supporting organisations of persons with disabilities as key partners in governance, and aligning disability rights with our security and justice systems.

Third, we must invest in institutional strengthening of organisations of persons with disabilities. This sits at the heart of the Pacific Disability Forum’s new agenda.

Our proposed new strategy – with a vision for an inclusive and equitable Pacific that enables persons with disabilities in all their diversity to assert and enjoy their rights as outlined in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and other human rights conventions – places strong emphasis on strengthening national organisations of persons with disabilities, building regional coordination capacity, and advancing leadership of persons with disabilities, including women and youth.

Strong institutions are essential to peace, without them inclusion remains rhetoric, and rhetoric is not a reality.

Disability inclusion in a changing Pacific

Looking ahead, several mega trends will shape peace and security in the Pacific, and each has important implications for disability inclusion.

Climate change remains an existential threat. Intensifying disasters, displacement and growing pressures on fragile systems multiply the risks faced by persons with disabilities. Unless inclusion is built into every climate response, persons with disabilities will continue to be left behind during the impact of climate change.

Demographic shifts and urbanisation risk shaping our societies. Growing youth population and rapid migration to towns and cities create opportunity, but also increase the risk of exclusion, inequality and social tension if inclusion of persons with disabilities is not prioritised.

Digital transformation is opening up new forms of service delivery and participation, but if digital accessibility is not built in from the start, we risk creating a new layer of exclusion.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Pacific are shifting with increasing strategic competition and external influence in our region. In that context, our peace and security framework must remain Pacific-led, inclusive and grounded in community resilience.

Lastly, our understanding of security itself is evolving. Security is no longer only about borders, it is about human security, social cohesion, inclusion and equity. Disability inclusion must therefore be seen as central to the broader security agenda.

A path to peace for all

We like to say that the Pacific is a region of peace; that we hold a strong vision for the future. We also have real concerns that demand urgent actions.

• One major concern is the persistent invisibility of persons with disabilities. Despite repeated commitments, they remain underrepresented in decision-making and are often excluded from peace and security dialogue.
• A second concern is weak institutional capacity. Without strong institutions, policies are not implemented, and rights are not realised. That is why institution strengthening is at the heart of the Pacific Disability Forum strategy.
• A third concern is that climate and disaster responses are still too often not inclusive. We continue to see evacuation centres that are inaccessible and early warning systems that do not reach everyone.
• A fourth concern is the continued gap in data. We cannot plan for inclusion if persons with disabilities remain statistically invisible.
• And finally, we are concerned about the risk of widening inequality as the region develops. Those already marginalised may fall even further behind if we do not act deliberately and inclusively.

As we look to the future, several questions warrant reflection.

Are we truly including persons with disabilities at the decision-making table, or are we still consulting only after decisions have already been made?

How are our peace and security frameworks measuring inclusion and equity in practice? Are our disaster and security systems designed for the most vulnerable or for an average citizen who does not, in fact, exist?

What would it take to ensure every early warning system reaches every person?

Are we investing enough in organisations of persons with disabilities and institutions of governance and peacebuilding?

How can regional mechanisms better support national level capacity and leadership?

And if the Blue Pacific is truly about collective stewardship, who is still being left behind, and why?

The future of peace and security in the Pacific will not be secured by infrastructure or policy alone. It will be secured by strong and inclusive institutions, by empowered communities, and by a collective commitment that no Pacific Islander, especially persons with disabilities, is left behind.

The refreshed Pacific Regional Framework on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is the Pacific Disability Forum’s own strategy, has given us a road map. Now our task is implementation with urgency, with integrity and with inclusion of persons with disabilities – they must be at the centre of all these processes.

Sainimili Tawake is the CEO of the Pacific Disability Forum. This article is a lightly edited version of an address delivered at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue.

Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.

Pacific Island governments need to create opportunities that support people to remain in their country, while also enabling mobility pathways that provide options for their communities, panellists at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue have said.

Tuvalu’s Minister for Transport, Energy, Communication and Innovation, the Honourable Simon Kofe; Professor Yvonne Underhill-Sem, from the University of Auckland; and Dr Henrietta McNeill-Stowers, from the Australian National University, featured on the Regional cooperation for Pacific mobility, dignity and adaptation panel at the Dialogue.

The panel discussed the benefits and challenges of mobility in the Pacific, including workforce impacts, return migration, labour mobility schemes, and the need to provide people with meaningful choices about where they live and work.

They also outlined the motivations for some Pacific islanders leaving their home countries, including pursuing employment or education opportunities, and the importance of people having the option to leave and return as they wish.

Speaking from Tuvalu’s perspective, Minister Kofe said that in the past, one of the drivers of migration was the conditions on the island, including droughts or other times of insufficient resources.

“I think the same would apply today. The conditions is one thing that drives people to leave. In the context of Tuvalu, people are looking for better education for their kids, better job opportunities,” he said.

“As a government we need to have a hard think about that, because I think if all things were equal in terms of conditions at home and conditions of where they’re traveling to, I am pretty confident that everyone would choose to stay back in Tuvalu.”

Professor Underhill-Sem recognised the legacy drivers of mobility, including service-based mobility and the pursuit of economic opportunities, and the increase in the number of women moving.

“Some of the very early drivers of mobility were curiosity-based, and a lot of that was people interested in just even going to another village nearby or another island,” she said.

“Increasingly, the environmental changes and the political changes that are happening in our countries are also a driver of mobility in our countries, and the political changes kind of move into the social changes that are happening in places as well.”

The panel discussed the implications of mobility, including on the workforces in Pacific Island countries, and the reintegration of citizens who return home, either by choice or through forced relocation or deportation.

Dr McNeill-Stowers raised the issue of ‘return mobility’ and highlighted the impacts of immigration policy changes, particularly in the United States, on Pacific communities.

“True mobility with dignity means that people can come home whenever they choose, but for some they don’t necessarily choose that. [They] are forced home and may not have been home for a long time,” she said.

She said the return of deported citizens shouldn’t be treated solely as a law enforcement or national security issue.

“[We should be] thinking about whole-of-government approaches, churches, and village governance structures that can help people and communities accommodate and accept, so that they can live in a positive and peaceful way in their homes,” she said.

The panel also reflected on whether the region was building nations that encouraged citizens to remain, or building systems to send people abroad.

Professor Underhill-Sem discussed the effects of labour mobility schemes on the region.

“There are pros and cons to some of the recent labour mobility programs we’ve had,” she said.

“It’s not just the worker, it’s not just the country, it’s not just the home place that benefits, but there are a myriad number of other entities and agencies who are part of mobility.

“If we look around the region, we will see the places that have been built by remittances, that are occupied by people who have returned, and we can see those ways in which that’s been quite positive.”

However, Professor Underhill-Sem said the New Zealand Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) labour mobility scheme had demonstrated some of the other impacts, particularly as research showed some people had been returning to the program for 10 years or longer.

“It starts to make those divisions in our communities, those who’ve got things and those who don’t. So, that’s one thing we’ve got to keep in mind, that it’s not a simple case of those coming and going.

“The second thing is that it really does allow our governments to abrogate their responsibilities in terms of providing the economic basis for employment, and this is not an easy task.”

Dr McNeill-Stowers echoed the concerns about the implications of mobility on communities.

“What does it mean for Pacific Island governments to be able to deliver core services if qualified and experienced healthcare or national security professionals are away on seasonal work?

“What does it mean when a country has an economically vital tourism industry, but have to import labour because there aren’t enough people at home to be able to service that industry?”

Speaking of the Falepili Union Treaty, Minister Kofe said Tuvalu’s motivation for the agreement was to provide freedom for people to travel, but he acknowledged it had impacts on the labour force.

“We just want to give people that opportunity to travel, explore other places, get better education for their children. But it comes with consequences as well.

“It’s important to think about how we can motivate, incentivise our people to stay. Of course, better pay is one major incentive for people to stay. But I think also, from a leadership level, is to have a vision that people can buy into.

“There has to be that vision and that environment for them to come and input their skill, and so I think that’s a responsibility of leadership.”

Minister Kofe said trends such as the increase in remote work presented opportunities for Tuvalu.

“We have this vision of a digital nation. In this day and age, you don’t necessarily need to be physically in Tuvalu to serve the country. You can work remotely, and COVID showed us that is actually possible. We have a digital nomad sector that is thriving as well.”

Pacific youth advocates have called for increased mental health services to support young people, particularly those affected by the region’s drug crisis.

Speaking at the Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue, a panel of young Pacific thinkers discussed pressing security issues facing the region, including the drug and HIV crisis and climate change, and their impact on youth.

‘Looking ahead: today’s youth on a secure future for the Blue Pacific’ featured Pacific Youth Council Chairperson Mori-m Mahoney Mori; President of the University of the South Pacific Students’ Association ‘Isitolo Siale; Abdul Shaheed from Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC); Environmental and Cultural Consultant Vehia Wheeler; and Pacific Conference of Churches Youth Minister Coordinator Olivia Baro.

The panellists raised the importance of addressing the social and economic drivers behind rising drug use in the region, as well as the need for proactive steps to strengthen mental health support and expand opportunities for young people.

Mr Shaheed highlighted the initial “knee-jerk” reactions of governments as the crisis emerged in the region.

“The perspective with which we developed programs was that this is a maritime issue, there’s a border security issue, that this is a criminal activity. We did not look at the social factors that led us to this stage,” he said.

“For me, the drug crisis is not necessarily only a maritime or border issue, it’s a human security issue. It is about the fact that there are not enough economic opportunities for young people who then get very quickly ensnared with the bad actors…coming into the region, using the region as transit points, propagating the use of drugs.

“Until we look at this as a social problem, not as a political or legal problem only, and not criminalising everything that goes wrong with our social issues, we will not protect human beings; we will not protect Pacific Islanders.”

Ms Wheeler agreed the region should strive for more economic equality in terms of jobs and social services.

“I’m wondering if…these stark inequalities are pushing people to drug use. I think we should work towards a holistic means of creating a better society, more access to basic needs, basic services, and see how our societies can improve from there.”

Several of the panellists discussed the urgent need for more mental health support and facilities, including as a preventative measure.

Mr Siale, from Tonga, said governments must prioritise mental health.

“We tend to focus more on the actual crime itself, instead of focusing on the root causes,” Mr Siale said.

“Why are people turning to drugs? It encompasses a lot of social issues [and] inequality in our communities, in our countries.

“Our communities are not supportive of opportunities for people to be open and to be able to share their struggles mentally and emotionally. It is very important for our government to put more emphasis on creating safe spaces for people, not just young people, people of all ages.”

Mr Mori raised the high rates of suicide among young people in the Federated States of Micronesia, and the cycle between mental health, drug use and domestic violence. He said it was a common story across the region, but that some countries weren’t equipped to provide the necessary support.

“There are some countries that just don’t have mental health facilities,” he said.

He said the increasing detection of drug smuggling vessels caught in the region suggested the crisis was only going to increase.

“We must recognise that we have no regional facility to respond to this issue. There’s none, but there’s hope. Because we are very capable of coming together and establishing institutions and facilities to protect our tuna. I think we can do the same for our people.”

Mrs Baro said the Pacific Conference of Churches had partnered with other stakeholders, including the Ministry of Policing and civil society organisations, on a national pastoral response in Fiji, and was focused on the human and social aspect of the crisis.

She said collaboration was essential.

“The whole of society, whole of government and whole of community must address this together. We must paddle the waka together,” she said.

“If people are doing different paddling, we’ll go forward, we’ll go backwards, sideways, and then we overturn, which is something that we wouldn’t want, given the risk that we are facing.”

The panel also explored other security issues facing the region including climate change and the Pacific’s nuclear legacy.

Mr Shaeed, Engagement and Outreach Lead at PISFCC, which spearheaded the campaign to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations regarding climate change, said the resolution at the United Nations General Assembly in May was a step to operationalising the ICJ’s ruling.

He said it gave the region another tool in its efforts to drive global climate action, but also urged the Pacific countries to remain accountable for their obligations.

“We no longer go into COP begging for sympathy and empathy. We go into COP telling countries ‘you have a responsibility’, but that responsibility…does not only lie on states who are causing this harm. It lies on us in the region also. How many of us in the region have codified a right to a healthy environment for our people?

“We need to lead the world as frontline communities, but we also need to show that leadership back home.”

Ms Wheeler said Pacific youth should strive to maintain their agency and voice in addressing environmental and security issues in the region.

“In French Polynesia, we experienced 193 nuclear explosions from 1966 to 1996 and today we continue to face ongoing environmental impacts, ongoing health impacts,” she said.

“We have to make sure that we have our own agency when we’re talking about security, and that we’re building up our own security before privileging others and outside security.”

The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent reminds us that security is not an end in itself, but part of a future we are deliberately shaping, one grounded in our shared values, identity, wellbeing, and responsibility to future generations, writes the Hon Simon Kofe.

The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent is often described as a development strategy, but at its heart it is a values-based vision for our region.

What makes it distinctive is that it begins not with economics, infrastructure, or trade, but with our people, cultures, and identities. It recognises that development is ultimately a means of safeguarding the values that define us as Pacific peoples.

These values include stewardship of our environment, respect for one another, collective responsibility, solidarity, reciprocity, and a commitment to the wellbeing of present and future generations. They are values that have sustained Pacific societies for centuries and that continue to shape how we understand leadership, governance, development, and our relationships with one another. Particularly, our Pacific value of collective responsibility and collectivism has often guided and moulded us as a stronger region.

In this sense, our values are more than aspirations. They are the compass that guides our decisions and informs the systems we build. The question before us, therefore, is not simply how we respond to security threats, but whether we have the wisdom and conviction to allow our values to guide our collective response to an increasingly complex and uncertain future.

Our ancestors faced their own uncertainties. They crossed vast oceans in small vessels, navigating unfamiliar waters, changing weather, and unknown horizons. Yet they did so with courage, wisdom, and an unwavering belief that beyond the sikulagi  – the horizon – lay opportunity and a better future for their people.

They were guided by the knowledge, values and traditions passed down through generations. Today, as we confront new challenges, from climate change and transnational crime to technological disruption and geopolitical competition, we are called to demonstrate that same resolve. The horizon before us may look different, but the compass remains the same.

The challenges confronting our region today are not merely technical or policy challenges. They are, in many respects, tests of leadership, tests of institutions, tests of unity and ultimately tests of values.

Climate change, for example, is often described as an environmental crisis. But at its core, it is also a crisis of values and ethics. It forces us to confront questions of responsibility, stewardship, intergenerational justice, and our obligations to those who are most vulnerable. It asks whether our responsibility to future generations will prevail over short-term interests. It also highlights the necessity of unified global solutions.

Transnational crime presents a different challenge. It is not only a test of law enforcement capacity. It is a test of the integrity of our leadership, systems and institutions. Criminal networks thrive where governance is weak, where information is not shared, where borders are poorly coordinated, and where public trust is eroded. The success of these networks often depends not on their strength, but on our fragmentation.

While climate change and transnational crime may appear very different, both reveal the same underlying lesson. Climate change exposes the costs of fragmented global action. Criminal networks exploit fragmented national responses. In both cases, our vulnerability is often found not in the threat itself, but in the gaps between us.

Likewise, technological disruption and geopolitical competition challenge our judgement, our resilience, and our ability to remain anchored to our values and each other while adapting to a rapidly changing world.

Viewed through this lens, the question is not simply whether we can respond to these challenges. The question is whether the values we proclaim are sufficiently strong to shape the systems we build and the decisions we make.

For if values are the compass of the Blue Pacific, then our institutions, policies, and regional arrangements are the vessels with which we navigate. One without the other is inadequate.

Regionalism in an interconnected world

In Tuvalu, we are taught from an early age that membership in a family comes with responsibilities. We are expected to contribute, to show respect, to exercise discipline, and to place the wellbeing of the collective alongside our own interests. Similar values can be found across the Pacific, expressed differently in different cultures, but reflecting a common understanding that individual wellbeing is inseparable from the wellbeing of the community.

I believe these same principles can be elevated beyond the national level to the regional level. Because regionalism is not simply a political arrangement. It is the application of Pacific values at a larger scale.

But the environment we are operating in today forces us to go further in our reflection. The challenge is no longer simply whether we cooperate. The challenge is whether our cooperation is structured in a way that prevents fragmentation from weakening us.

Fragmentation is now one of the most persistent strategic vulnerabilities facing our region. It appears in differences in rules and standards, in uneven enforcement across jurisdictions, and in the ability of external players, whether criminal networks, commercial interests, or geopolitical actors, to exploit these gaps. Fragmentation rarely announces itself as a threat. Yet over time it erodes effectiveness, weakens resilience, and diminishes our collective influence.

This is where we can draw useful lessons from the experience of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement or the PNA. Formed to manage fisheries, specifically for skipjack tuna, the PNA recognised that fisheries could never be simply a national matter in the Pacific due to the movement of fish across national maritime boundaries.

I do not suggest that the PNA is a perfect model, nor that its arrangements can be directly transplanted into other areas. Rather, its significance lies in the values and principles that underpin it. By examining those foundations, we can identify patterns of success that offer useful insights for how we approach security challenges across our region.

The success of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement was not simply the result of cooperation. It was the result of deliberate choices made to harmonise conservation and management measures, coordinate access arrangements, establish common benchmarks, strengthen enforcement, and share information. In doing so, the PNA reduced the ability of external actors to exploit differences between states and strengthened their collective position.

Most importantly, the PNA demonstrated that in an interconnected world, sovereignty is often strengthened, not diminished, when states act collectively. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement increased their strategic influence by aligning their efforts around common rules, shared responsibilities, and a unified purpose.

That lesson extends far beyond fisheries. It has relevance for aviation, labour mobility, border management, maritime surveillance, immigration, cybersecurity, and regional security cooperation. In each of these areas, fragmentation creates vulnerability, while coordination creates strength.

We are already beginning to see this principle reflected in emerging regional initiatives such as the Pacific Blue Shipping Partnership, which was formally established in the Republic of the Marshall Islands just last week. The Partnership works alongside Pacific Transport Ministers to advance the decarbonisation of domestic shipping across the region and catalyse large-scale climate finance investment to transition to low carbon shipping.

While focused on maritime transport, its significance extends beyond shipping itself. It represents a recognition that many of the challenges facing our region can no longer be addressed effectively through isolated national responses alone. By pursuing common standards, shared objectives, and coordinated action, Pacific countries are demonstrating how regional cooperation can strengthen resilience while respecting national sovereignty.

This is why regionalism must be understood as more than an aspiration. In an increasingly interconnected and contested world, it is becoming a practical necessity for safeguarding both our interests and our independence.

Navigating the Blue Pacific future

The 2050 Strategy challenges us to think beyond immediate pressures and short-term responses. It asks us to consider what kind of region we are building, what values will guide it, and what responsibilities we owe to those who will inherit it.

Security therefore cannot be measured solely by the absence of conflict or the strength of enforcement institutions. True security is found in resilient communities, trusted institutions, effective governance, environmental stewardship, and a region capable of acting collectively when confronted with shared challenges.

The Pacific has never lacked courage. Our history is proof of that. The question before us is whether we can match that courage with the discipline, foresight, and unity required to navigate the challenges of this century.

Our ancestors understood that survival at sea depended on more than a destination. It required a clear sense of direction, confidence in the vessel, trust among the crew, and the wisdom to adapt to changing conditions without losing sight of the horizon. The same is true for our region today.

The compass remains our values.

The vessel is the system of institutions, partnerships, and regional arrangements we build together.

The voyage is the future of the Blue Pacific.

And the test before us is whether we have the leadership to ensure that our values are not merely spoken, but translated into the systems, decisions, and actions that will carry our peoples safely through the uncertainties ahead.

If we succeed, future generations will inherit more than secure borders, stronger institutions, or greater prosperity. They will inherit a region that remained true to its values when those values were tested most severely.

The Hon Simon Kofe is Tuvalu’s Minister for Transport, Energy, Communication and Innovation. This keynote speech was delivered at the 2026 Pacific Peace and Security Dialogue.

Views expressed via the Pacific Wayfinder blog are not necessarily those of the Pacific Security College. Read our publishing policy.