The Ocean of Peace: Vision to Treaty

Executive summary

The Pacific is in a state of permanent strategic competition.

This has been true for some time.

It is unlikely to change for the better any time soon.

And it will only become more difficult to manage.

Geopolitics is hardening

2026 began with the Chinese blockade exercise of Taiwan, followed by United States (US) military action in Venezuela and then Iran.

This has prompted discussion of a ‘rupture’ of the global system as we know it.

The end of the rules-based order, multilateralism and the United Nations; raising concerns for many countries, particular those for whom international law, global norms and the United Nations give voice.

And prompting some to call for a renewed focus on mini-lateralism and middle power activism.

Asking questions for countries that are neither nuclear hegemons nor middle powers.

How do countries without nuclear weapons or military, trade or economic heft protect their interests?

Or, to put it bluntly, how do they prevent themselves from being on the menu when
they’re not even at the table?

Strategic competition will sharpen in the Pacific

In 2027, the so-called ‘Davidson window’ opens as China acquires the capability, but not necessarily the intent, to retake Taiwan militarily.

Ahead of this, President Xi reportedly issued President Trump with a sharp warning over Taiwan during their recent summit in Beijing. Xi telling Trump that “the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-US relations” and that “if it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts”.

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the Pacific’s strategic geography is critical for military access and denial. Raising the stakes for strategic competition in the Pacific. And increasing the premium on the decisions the Pacific takes individually and collectively around strategic partners, security cooperation and dual-use infrastructure.

In this context, how should the Pacific manage geopolitics in its region and continue to exercise agency and authority in its own interests?

The Ocean of Peace Declaration sets out Pacific strategic expectations

The Pacific worldview is clear.

Peace, security, development. On its own terms and aligned with its own values, interests and aspirations. Framed by the rules-based order and international law. Founded on the fundamental tenets of the law of the sea, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Pacific’s key priority is climate change. It is an existential threat to Pacific livelihoods, security and wellbeing.

The region seeks to prosecute its interests through an approach that is inclusive of all and grounded in community, civil society, the church and long-standing traditions of customary peace and reconciliation practices.

The Pacific commitment is clear: a culture of peace grounded in the Pacific Way.

The Pacific is equally clear about what it wants to see from its friends and partners.

Engagement based on the Pacific Way.

Respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality.

A Pacific-led and Pacific Islands Forum-endorsed approach.

And, most importantly, bold, decisive and transformative action to stop global warming.

Turning vision into law and practice will help

The Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration is a clear statement of the Pacific’s strategic vision for its own region.

As a next step, the Pacific could embed the Ocean of Peace and Pacific values, norms and practice into international law and practice, as it has done previously with nuclear weapons, fishing and climate change.

The Pacific could agree to an Ocean of Peace treaty to:

• establish the Pacific Ocean as a Zone of Peace
• embed the Pacific Way as the cornerstone of international engagement in the region
• agree to strategic transparency and consultation measures, particularly in relation to defence and security agreements and engagement with external powers
• establish climate security as a peace obligation
• agree to binding crisis management procedures
• provide a mechanism for external powers to commit to strategic restraint
• strengthen regional peace and security governance and institutional arrangements.

One option could be to negotiate the new regional peace and security treaty as a protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga. This would transform a respected and foundational nuclear-free zone into a legally binding regional peace and security system built and owned by the Pacific.

But such a regional peace and security treaty is not without risk. The negotiations could fracture regional unity and trigger geopolitical pushback – real risks in a strategic environment already fraught with peril.

On the plus side, there may be a strategic opening through President Trump’s “decent peace” in the Indo-Pacific and President Xi’s constructive strategic stability.

The strategic guardrails set out in a regional peace and security agreement could help the Pacific manage the difficult geopolitical environment ahead.

None are perfect.

And they won’t necessarily stop strategic competition.

But they could help manage it and make the region more predictable and less dangerous.

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In conversation with

Tuiloma Neroni Slade

Former Secretary General, Pacific Islands Forum

Dr Sandra Tarte

Associate Professor, University of the South Pacific

Dr Anna Naupa

Research and Engagement Fellow, Pacific Security College

Sione Tekiteki

Senior Lecturer and Associate Dean, Pacific, Auckland University of Technology Law School

About the Pacific Security College Policy Paper Series

This paper is published by the Pacific Security College. It reflects the views of the author alone and isn’t an official statement on behalf of the College, its funders, or the Australian National University. The Policy Paper Series aims to contribute a diversity of views and ideas to the regional conversation about the journey to 2050.